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§. Introduction 
Art allows for the individual soul to utter what the conscious mind cannot. 
From prehistoric cave drawings to depictions of religious relics, to the works of art 
created by the humanistic masters of the Renaissance, serve as indicators that artistic 
expression permeates our world and transcends cultures and time. Artistic 
expression serves as an instinctive outlet in humanity’s pursuit for harmony, rhythm, 
and balance: it is often regarded as an experience of the mysterious and an expression 
of the imagination. In some cultures, art is used in ritualistic and symbolic functions: 
it can be vehicle for communication, an outlet for entertainment, or a movement 
aimed at political change. Art is sometimes created for the purposes of social inquiry 
and psychological healing. Art serves a motivated purpose both intrinsically as 
personal expression and extrinsically in that it provokes critical reflection and 
challenges societal norms. The ruminating idea presented here is that art—as an 
object and as a practice—adds another distinctly human dimension to our lives by 
enabling us to connect to the world around us which motivates us to connect to 
something higher. There seems to be something, either inherently valuable within the 
artwork itself, or inherently valuable about art as a practice, or both. And in both 
cases, it is something we as human beings continue to pursue, to preserve, and to 
extend as a diverse but unifying practice. 
Despite all this evidence for the validity of the arts, Plato establishes a harsh 
critique of the arts in the Republic. In books II and III, he suggests that the beginning 
of any process is the most important, especially for the young and tender. He goes on 
to say that when a person is the most malleable, she will take on the pattern of 
Liddell 5 
 
behavior the influencer wishes to impress upon them (377a–b). In the same passage, 
he argues that one of the many problematic outcomes for a society that embraces art 
is that art can corrupt the youth. He says that the young cannot distinguish the real 
from the allegorical, and the opinions they absorb at that age are so hard to erase as 
to be potentially unalterable (378d). 
Art, like the body, is physical. For Plato, it stands to inhibit one's ability to share 
in Truth, and ultimately, the Good, which both are nonphysical. In book IV, he 
provides reasons to suggest art does this by rousing the passions to align with one’s 
base desires, which always implies a movement against or resistance to reason. So, 
Plato’s solution, which I will further elaborate in the sections to come, is to impose a 
strict censorship on, or even banishment of, the arts. 
One may ask, “Why focus on the argument against the arts from the Republic?” 
The assumptions that Plato uses to formulate his arguments are obsolete. 
Professional philosophers are far removed from speaking about the Forms. They do 
not consider this framework when engaging on matters regarding epistemology, 
philosophy of science, metaethics, and so forth. So why put forth the effort to address 
an argument that seems to lack any relevance or merit in a contemporary context?” 
Suppose for instance, Plato’s take on art extends beyond the limited realm of 
the performative arts that depict the misguided actions of Greek heroes and gods and 
how those arts positively or negatively impact the educational development of a 
citizen. Rather, I argue that what he means by “art” is the seemingly all-encompassing 
realm of artifacts and performative expressions that reflect our overall cultural 
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condition.1 Art today, as Plato would understand it, includes art qua performance or 
entertainment. Authority figures such as parents, school districts, educational boards, 
and governments engage in a perennial discussion that asks what sorts of arts are 
appropriate for public consumption and, at its most heated depths, what sorts of arts 
are appropriate for children. Let us assume that children possess the most 
impressionable natures, and that those who are the most impressionable are the most 
susceptible to corruption. One is left to ask, if children are easily impressionable, 
thereby making them the most susceptible to corruption, then do we (as parents, 
educators, government, society-at-large) want to expose our children to morally 
questionable arts—which, based on Plato’s writings and many of our own lived 
experiences, threatens the corruption of our fledgling citizens’ moral psychology? 
Plato argues that the youth are unable to reason in such a way as to make healthy 
decisions about their consumption of ideas and says that “we should probably take 
the utmost care to ensure that the first stories they hear about virtue are the best ones 
for them to hear” (378e).2 Thus, in the case of the arts specifically, one is tempted to 
view Plato’s argument in new light and agree that censorship, especially in the case 
of children is not only necessary, but should be upheld as a best practice.3  
                                                 
1 Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963), 10 
2 Havelock’s interpretation of Plato’s response is that “[mimetic] poetry as educational discipline poses 
a moral danger [as well as] an intellectual one. It confuses a man’s values and renders him 
characterless, and it robs him of any insight of the truth. Havelock, Preface to Plato, 6. 
3 The concern for censorship need not only apply to children but is also discussed when it comes to 
exposing certain kinds of entertainment to the public masses. 
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On the other side of the camp, an advocate for the arts, the aesthete,4 may 
conclude that Plato’s suggestion to ban the arts from the Republic—or our modern 
lives—is like sentencing a person to death without due process or a fair trial.5 It seems 
utterly unfair and wrong. One reason for this reaction could be because despite its 
“moral danger,” there still exists something inherently valuable about art: something 
riveting, mysterious, and special. This value extends to appreciating the relationship 
between the artist and her craft or practice; understanding the global relevance of art 
as a vehicle for communication and a catalyst for social change. All of which lends 
itself to a feeling that the inherent value of art ought to be preserved. However, as 
previously mentioned, when considering Plato’s concern in the case of the public (and 
more specifically, of children) as well as the consequential impediments of being 
exposed to morally questionable arts, one may easily give credence to his argument 
despite their artistic affections. It seems justified to suggest that we do not want our 
children emulating morally questionable activities, nor do we want to expose them to 
behaviors or input that stand to corrupt their moral character development.  
 This paper explores the possibility of a cohesive philosophy that recognizes 
both Plato’s concern about art as a moral danger and art as something worth 
preserving. Its goal is not to outright disagree with Plato. Rather it seeks first to 
understand the potential dangers of art as he understood them. To accomplish this 
task, I unpack his argument that the soul is tripartite (Platonic moral psychology) and 
                                                 
4 By aesthete, I mean to refer to “a person who affects great love of art, music, poetry… [and other fine 
and performative arts,] and who indifference to practical matters [or moral consequences for being 
exposed to such arts].” (see dictionary.com) 
5 Havelock’s notes that part of this ‘insensitivity’ to the preservation of the arts could be a response to 
the cultural and religious implications of his time. Havelock, Preface to Plato, 12. 
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the principle of specialization (Plato’s guiding principle for finding justice within the 
macrocosm and justice within the individual). From there, once it is understood fully 
what motivates his concern, the paper’s secondary goal is to resituate his argument 
and suggest that an overlap exists between art’s aesthetic (intellectual) dimension 
and its moral dimension. I maintain that through negotiation and compromise, a 
reclassified understanding of the imitative arts can co-exist in this intellectual 
dimension and the moral dimension. Next, I argue that Plato’s problem with art is not 
within the aesthetic dimension but rather stems from his fear of what might happen 
when art ignites the passions to side with one’s desires: promulgation of ignorance, 
disruption of the harmonious balance within the individual, and ultimately, 
corruption of the Kallipolis. To support this claim, this paper offers examples of 
contemporary art forms that highlight the distinction between those arts that are a 
kind of vessel for intellectual engagement and arts that appeal to one’s base desires. 
Finally, I show that art understood as a vehicle for critical reflection should alleviate 
Plato’s concern about its moral danger and supports Plato’s thesis on the individual 
and the acquisition for knowledge. I accomplish this by drawing on Plato’s Divided 
Line theory and the Allegory of the Cave. 
In the first section, I provide a definition of art to which Plato is referencing in 
the Republic. Next, I offer a thorough explanation of Plato’s utopian educational 
project and how this project leads to a discussion on art. Plato understood art to be a 
kind of imitation and distinguishes art as copy making from art as impersonation. His 
argument against art as copy making is grounded in his Theory of Forms, whereas his 
argument against art as impersonation is predicated on the Principle of 
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Specialization, which I explore in the third and fourth sections. Additionally, while 
both arguments are intended to bring to light the impossibility of art cohabitating 
with morality in the Utopian city, I note in the same section that Plato launches his 
attack from two different angles: the first is motivated by his epistemic concern 
regarding the nature of art and the acquisition of knowledge, while the second 
addresses his moral concern regarding the psychological development of one’s soul.  
 
§. Contemporary versus Traditional: Plato’s Definition of Art 
 Art, in and of itself, is difficult to define. In contemporary thought, 
philosophers have argued whether art can be defined, and for or against the 
usefulness of definitions of art.6 Let us presuppose that art can be defined. In such 
instance, there are two camps in which definitions of art might reside: the 
contemporary and the traditional. Contemporary definitions of art are of two main 
sorts. The first is a more modernist, conventional sort which focuses on the 
institutional features of art, emphasizing how art breaks away from traditional 
notions of art and changes over time.7 The latter is less conventional in that it makes 
use of a broader, more traditional concept of aesthetic properties.8 Traditional 
definitions of art take the view that artworks—whether fine or performative—are 
characterized by at least a single property. The standard candidates—though 
admittedly there might be more—are representational properties, expressive 
                                                 
6 Adajian, Thomas, "The Definition of Art", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 
Edition) 
7 Adajian, "The Definition of Art" 
8 Adajian, "The Definition of Art" 
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properties, and formal properties.9 The traditional definitions of art maintain that 
these properties are not sufficient conditions of an artwork—rather, all three are 
required to classify and distinguish an artwork from an ordinary object (a book on 
poetry, for instance, as distinct from an instruction manual).10 Plato’s understanding 
of art follows the traditional definitions of art. 
 In the Republic, and elsewhere in the Platonic dialogues, Plato understood art 
to be a kind of mimêsis.11 Mimêsis is defined as dramatic imitation or impersonation.12 
In short, mimetic arts are representational. Or, as Plato says, “…to make oneself like 
someone else in voice or appearance is to imitate the person one makes oneself 
like...the…poets effect their narrative through imitation (393c–d). In the Republic, 
mimêsis is understood as both copy making and impersonation—which are 
ontologically inferior to the non-physical forms and subservient to moral realities. 
Before one can address the potential dangers of art, it is first important to understand 
how both copy making and impersonation pose considerable dangers for the 
individual. This is explained in the section to follow, after a thorough presentation of 
Plato’s Utopian project, and how that led to a discussion on art. 
 
§. Plato on Constructing the Just City and Educational System 
 When Plato wrote the educational curricula outlined in the Republic, it served 
partly as an indictment of the Greek tradition and the Greek educational system.13 
                                                 
9 Adajian, "The Definition of Art" 
10 Adajian, "The Definition of Art" 
11 Havelock, Preface to Plato, 20 
12 Havelock, Preface to Plato, 20. 
13 Havelock, Preface to Plato, 12 
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While the political framework maybe utopian, the educational proposals are not.14 
The Republic introduces itself as a problem which is not philosophical in a specialized 
sense, but rather social and cultural.15 This paper assumes Plato’s argument against 
the arts in the Republic is actually a treatise, in disguise, aimed at impressing on the 
reader the importance of a moral education.16  
In the Republic, Plato’s overarching project is to inquire about and eventually 
identify the nature of justice. What is justice? How can one either define or identify 
justice? If justice can be defined, why should one be just? As Plato understands it, 
justice belongs to the “finest class,”17 and it is valuable for its own sake and the sake 
of its consequences (357c). He thinks that there are two ways justice can manifest: 
justice belonging to the city or state and justice belonging to the individual. To identify 
justice in the individual, one must first identify justice on a larger scale. Hence, he 
points his readers to his paradigmatic construction of a city as an instrument for 
identifying and defining justice.  
Before Plato begins the literary construction of his ideal polis or Kallipolis, he 
first introduces what he considers the foundational principle of human society: the 
principle of specialization. The principle of specialization states that each person must 
perform the role for which he is naturally best suited and that he must not meddle in 
any other business (370a–c). The farmer, for instance, must spend most his time 
producing food for others. He says, “…the doer must…pay close attention to his work 
                                                 
14 Havelock, Preface to Plato, 13 
15 Havelock, Preface to Plato, 12 
16 Havelock, Preface to Plato, 13 
17 Plato, Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997), 971-
1223. 
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rather than treating it as a secondary occupation…the result, then, is that more 
plentiful and better quality goods [will be produced] if each person does one thing for 
which he is naturally suited…and is released from having to do any of the others” 
(370b–c). By adhering to this standard, Plato is convinced that productivity and 
efficiency are maximized. Having isolated and explicated the foundational principle 
of the city, Plato is now ready to construct the Kallipolis. The first roles to fill are those 
that will provide for the necessities of life, such as food, clothing, health, and shelter. 
These roles are attributed to the producing class. He states:  
They’ll produce bread, wine, clothes, and shoes…They’ll build houses, work 
naked and barefoot in the summer, and wear adequate clothing and shoes in 
the winter…For food, they’ll knead and cook flour and meal they’ve made from 
wheat and barley. They’ll put their honest cakes and loaves on reeds or clean 
leaves, and reclining on beds strewn with yew and myrtle, they’ll feast with 
their children, drink their wine, and, crowned with wreaths, hymn the gods. 
They’ll enjoy sex with one another but bear no more children than their 
resources allow, lest they fall into either poverty or war (372b). 
After Plato finalizes the construction of this just city, he views this design to be one of 
good health and prosperity. He states, “They’ll live in peace and good health, and 
when they die at ripe old age, they’ll bequeath a similar life to their children” (372d). 
Despite his attempts to create a suitable example of a just city, Glaucon, Plato’s 
principal interlocutor in the Republic, calls the healthy city a “city of pigs” (372d). He 
claims if they are not going to suffer hardship, “they should recline on proper couches, 
dine at tables, and have…delicacies and desserts…” (372d). So, to address Glaucon’s 
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criticism, Plato must now accommodate for delicacies. Thus, the next stage in Plato’s 
thought experiment is to transform this healthy city into the luxurious city (372e).  
For a city to accommodate certain delicacies such as “perfumed oils, incense, 
prostitutes, and pastries” (373a), Plato says that we “must enlarge our city, for the 
healthy one is no longer adequate. We must increase it in size and fill it with…things 
that go beyond what is necessary…” (373b–c). Moreover, to feed the population, he 
assesses that “we’ll have to seize some of our neighbor’s land if we’re to have enough 
pasture and ploughland” (373d). In which case, a class of warriors will be needed18 to 
keep the peace within the city and to protect it from outside forces (373e–374a). So, 
for this reason, he creates the guardian class: the auxiliary and the rulers. 
It is crucial that guardians develop the right balance between gentleness and 
toughness. Plato says “they must be gentle to their own people and harsh to the 
enemy” (375b–c). Members of this class must be carefully selected. The guardians 
must be persons with the correct nature or innate psychology. They should be 
spirited, or honor-loving, philosophical, or knowledge-loving, and physically strong 
and fast (375e). The guardians shall be properly educated in music and poetry 
because “rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the soul, more than 
anything else, affecting it most strongly and bring it to grace” (402d–e). Secondly, the 
young shall be given physical training for “…[a] good soul by its own virtue makes the 
body good…” (403c). 
                                                 
18 Plato stays true to his principle of specialization as identified in the first city. He reiterates that “it’s 
impossible for a single person to practice many crafts or professions as well.” See Plato, Republic, 
374a 
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One may question why Plato thinks a citizen must be first educated in music 
and poetry, and then properly trained in the physical arts. He believes that “the 
beginning of any process is the most important, especially for the young and tender. 
It is now that [the child] is the most malleable and takes on any pattern one wishes to 
impress on [her]” (377a). For this reason, Plato suggests that we must “supervise the 
storytellers [and] we’ll select their stories whenever they are fine or beautiful and 
reject them when they aren’t…” (377b). Although Plato sees the merit in educating 
the guardians in music and poetry, he proposes a strict censorship of Homer and 
Hesiod’s works because certain segments of their content threaten to corrupt the 
young mind. Plato provides an account on the introduction of philosophy as education 
to equip the guardian with the means to exercise reason and formulate a good 
character. He adds that a potentially virtuous person learns to love and take pleasure 
in virtuous actions but must wait until late in life to develop the understanding that 
explains why what he loves is good.19 Once the more mature guardian has learned 
what the good is, his informed love of the good explains why he acts and does and 
why his actions are virtuous.20 Plato offers a break down of mimetic arts, and why, if 
left unchecked, both copy and impersonation pose a danger to the individual and 
society at large. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Marcia Homiak, “Moral Character,” ed. Edward N. Zalta, (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
2016) 
20 Ibid. Marcia Homiak “Moral Character” 
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§. Mimetic Art as Copy making and as Impersonation 
Plato’s understanding of mimetic art as copy making and his arguments 
against it is predicated on his understanding of the Theory of Forms. He classifies a 
Form as a paradigm that is “one-over-many” (100c)21 and says that they are divine 
(80a–b), intelligible (79a), and eternal (79d). He suggests that “…we customarily 
hypothesize a single form about each other of the many things to which we apply the 
same name” (569a). The idea here is that whenever we have two or more things in 
common, there exists a Form. For example, there is a red apple on my counter. I am 
wearing red gloves. I drive, or at least in some possible world, a red Lamborghini 
Murcielago. Since each of these have something in common (i.e., redness), there exists 
a Form-Red from which all “red” things participate in. He continues, “…there are 
certain forms from which these other things, by getting a share of them, derive their 
names—as for instance, they come to be like by getting a share of likeness, large by 
getting a share of largeness, and just and beautiful by getting a share of justice and 
beauty.”22 Given this understanding, Plato moves to a discussion on art as copy 
making. He says, “…[there are] three kinds of beds [or natures]. The first is in nature 
[the Form] …the second is the work of the carpenter [the imperfect copy] …and the 
third is the one the painter makes [the copy of an imperfect copy] …” (597b). The 
carpenter “…doesn’t make the form…but only a bed…” (596e). In other words, the 
carpenter looks to the Forms to build the intended craft (605a–b). The painter, on the 
other hand, is not a “…maker of such things…” rather “…he imitates…” (597d). Plato 
                                                 
21 S. Marc Cohen, “The ‘One’ Over Many Argument” 
22 Plato, Parmenides, trans. G.M.A. Grube, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997), 
359-397.  
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states, “[the painter] is an imitator of what others make” (597d). The primary 
difference between the craftsman and the painter is that the craftsman—though he 
produces an imperfect copy of a perfect form—looks to the form to produce his craft. 
Hence, Plato considers this an honest or even virtuous failing. The artist, however, is 
not looking to the Forms. Rather, he looks to the imperfect copy of the Form and 
copies or imitates it. Plato says the imitation “is far removed from truth…” (598b), 
and the artist “…can’t distinguish between knowledge, ignorance, and imitation” 
(598d); thus, he “can deceive children and foolish people into thinking that [he] is 
truly a carpenter” (598c). Mimetic art is a “shadow-show of phantoms, like those 
images seen in the darkness on the wall of the cave.”23  
In the Phaedo, he suggests that the goal of every person should be to seek 
separation from his body so that his soul can enter the realm of the Forms, allowing 
him to immediately intuit knowledge (64a–65a). The philosopher embarks on this 
process by looking to the Forms. The artist looks to the “particular,” which is an 
imperfect copy of the form. Hence, it can be inferred that if the carpenter commits a 
virtuous failing by crafting an imperfect item, then the artist has committed an 
ultimate failing because she does not look to the Forms at all. And in showing her 
work, she is promoting her own vanity and leaving the audience to formulate 
opinions; thus, promulgating an inescapable ignorance of which the audience will 
struggle to break free. Despite the artist’s failing by promulgating ignorance or the 
viewer’s failing in ignorantly receiving it, art as copy making serves as an epistemic 
                                                 
23 Havelock, Preface to Plato, 25 
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concern rather than a danger to one’s moral development.24 It is true that in the Meno, 
Plato introduces the possibility of virtue as a kind of moral knowledge and as such it 
has the capacity to be taught to others (87b–c).  
Art as copy making poses a danger to the individual—not necessarily by 
jeopardizing their moral psychology, but by inhibiting their ability to look to the 
Forms. By moving us away from the Forms, and ultimately Knowledge and the Good, 
the artist is promoting a kind of willful ignorance that deters an individual from 
seeking, and thus sharing in, true knowledge.  
 Plato’s understanding of mimetic art as impersonation and his arguments 
against it is heavily influenced by the Principle of Specialization. His concern 
regarding art in this context is its profound ability to corrupt the individual soul and 
eventually distort the just and harmonious balance of the Kallipolis. Before one can 
understand the potential dangers of impersonation, it is important to grasp Plato’s 
                                                 
24 Platonists, such as Plotinus, Frege, DeWitt, and Quine, have focused a considerable amount of 
attention on making sense of Plato’s metaphysics, namely the Theory of Forms. Their opponents, 
Aristotle, Vlastos (1954), Geach (1956), Strang (1971), and Cohen (1971, 2006) have focused on the 
purported incoherency of the Theory of Forms. S Marc Cohen presents three objections to the Theory 
of Forms: 1) the Extent of the World of Forms (130e-131a), 2) the Nature of Participation (131a-e), and 
3) the Third Man Argument (Cohen 1971, Geach 1956). The most powerful objection of the three is the 
TMA objection. The TMA argument encompasses three premises regarding the Theory of the Forms: 
one-over-many (OM), self-predication (SP), and Non-Identity (NI). To review: OM states that there is a 
Form for any set of things we judge to share a predicate in common. For example, if a collection of 
things such as Oak Tree, Weeping Willow Tree, and Evergreen Tree, all share in the Form-Tree, then 
there is a single Form by participating in which they are all Form-Tree. SP states that the Form by 
which things are (and are judged to be) F is itself F. For instance, Tree-ness is Form-Tree. And lastly, 
NI states that the Form is by which a set of things are all F is not itself a member of that set. Equivalently, 
noting is F by participation. Tree-ness (n) in this case does not participate in Tree-ness (n). 
(Summarized in Cohen’s “The Logic of the Third Man.” For full citation, see Cohen’s Criticism to the 
Theory of Forms). Plato himself identifies the severity of the TMA objection for he notes in the 
Parmenides, “each of your Forms will no longer be one, but unlimited in multitude” (130d). See S. Marc 
Cohen, “The Logic of the Third Man,” The Philosophical Review 80, no. 4 (October 1971): 448-475 
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notion of the soul, which at the heart is the foundation for his theory of moral 
psychology. 
 For Plato, the individual soul is tripartite: it possesses a rational part, a spirited 
part, and an appetitive part. The rational part governs one’s reason; the spirited part 
governs one’s passions or emotions; the appetitive part governs one’s desires. He 
says, “it is obvious that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites 
in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time. Hence, if we 
ever find this happening in the soul, we will know that we are not dealing with one 
thing but many” (436b–c). So, if one were to say “I want to eat three pizzas, but I do 
not want to eat three pizzas,” one is not completely absurd per Plato’s account. One is 
saying “The appetitive part of my soul desires to eat three pizzas; however, the 
rational part of one’s soul asserts that it would not be wise or arguably in my best 
interest to act on such a desire.” In such case, the appetitive part of the soul is in 
contention with the rational part. This is an example of Plato’s use of the Principle of 
Non-Contradiction: something cannot be both p and not-p at the same time. Plato 
continues his investigation by reflecting on the third part of the soul: spirit. Is it the 
case that the spirited part of the soul is uniquely distinct? Or, is it one and the same 
with either the rational part of the soul or the appetitive part of the soul? Plato claims 
that the spirited part can sometimes make war with the appetites (440a). The worry 
here is that Plato does not want the soul’s appetites to make war with reason.  
So, what does Plato recommend as it relates to the artist? He says,  
If a man, who through clever training can become anything and imitate 
anything, should arrive in our city, wanting to give performance of his 
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poems…we should tell him that there is no one like him in our city and that it 
isn’t lawful for there to be. We should pour myrrh on his head, crown him with 
wreaths, and send him away to another city (398a–b). 
Like stories told of gods and heroes participating in morally questionable acts, Plato 
argues that morally questionable forms of imitative arts entice the participant to 
behave immorally, which inevitably corrupts the soul. Thus, he mandates that any 
artistic expression considered to be distasteful and unfavorable should be banned or 
heavily censored.25 
A second concern for Plato stems from his conviction that art as impersonation 
interferes and conflicts with the principle of specialization. As elucidated in the first 
section of this paper, the principle states that each person must perform the role for 
which he is naturally best suited and that he must not meddle in any other’s business 
(370a–c). Initially, Plato rejects the idea that guardians should also become imitators. 
He says, “Our guardians must be kept away from all other crafts to be craftsmen of the 
freedom, and …do nothing at all except what contributes to it…” (395b–c). Here, he is 
suggesting that a person who focuses on a single occupation is more likely to perform 
that occupation well. And contrastingly, a person who focuses on several occupations 
or “meddles in the affairs of others,” is going against the principle of specialization 
                                                 
25 Although it is not conclusive, Iris Murdoch, The Fire and the Sun, argues extensively that Plato 
intended to ban the artists from his utopian education project. (Murdoch 1977). Rachana Kamtekar, 
on the other hand, makes this point more explicit. She says, “Plato does not ban painting…It is true that 
paintings are like poems in being imitations, and that imitations are inferior to things they imitate. But 
Socrates uses this point not to banish all imitations but to argue, against those who think that the poets 
‘know all crafts, all human affairs concerned with virtue and vice, and all about the gods’ (589d-e), that 
producers of imitators cannot be teachers. For if they could produce virtuous deeds, they would not 
devote themselves to producing imitations of them in poetry (599a-b); and as it happens, they have no 
good laws, successful wars, inventions in the crafts and sciences, ways of life or virtuous individuals to 
their credit.” (See Kamtekar, “Plato on Education and Art” p.352) 
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and is at risk of poorly doing multiple things. Plato concludes that the guardians must 
focus on their primary specialization which is to guide and protect the Kallipolis. 
However, he grants that if imitation must occur, it must take place during childhood. 
He notes that children must imitate those endeavors that are appropriate to them 
“[because] imitations practiced as youth become part of nature and settle into habits 
of gesture, voice, and thought.” (359c–d).26 Given both accounts, one can begin to 
stitch together the moral underpinnings of Plato’s concern regarding art as 
impersonation.  
 In his first concern, Plato postulates that those mimetic arts deemed to be 
unsavory or distasteful in nature poses a moral danger by enticing one to emulate 
immoral behavior; hence, corrupting the soul. In his second concern, impersonation 
presents a different kind of danger—specifically by interfering with the primary 
function of the guardian, which is to be the craftsman of the city’s freedom (395b–c), 
and forces them to focus on several occupations instead of just the one.27 Given this 
account, it seems reasonable to infer that Plato’s concern is not just that 
impersonation stands to distract the guardian from her primary duties nor merely 
corrupting her soul. Rather, what is gravely at stake is that the art form of 
impersonation is in direct conflict with the principle of specialization. In the same 
way that the just city has three individual classes (the Guardians, the Auxiliary, and 
                                                 
26 Plato, Republic, 395 c-d. On this account, Plato is talking about the effects of playing the part of 
character in a play or poem, or perhaps reading aloud (Summarized from Rachana, “Plato on Education 
and Art” p. 350) 
27 It must be noted that per the principle of specialization, there could exist those who are born with 
natural propensities for creativity and art. So, it is not the case that one will be both a guardian and an 
artist, or a craftsman and a performer. Rather, it’s these individuals who will rise above the rest and be 
identified as artists in the city.  
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the Craftsmen), the soul has three individual parts (Reason, Spirit, and the Appetites). 
As previously stated in section one, the project of the Republic is to understand to 
what class justice belongs to and to identify the nature of justice within the individual 
by first looking at justice on a microcosmic scale. From that vantage point, it can be 
reasonably inferred that the three individual classes outlined in the Republic align 
with the three individual parts of the soul. Thus, the principle of specialization which 
governs the Kallipolis can also be said to govern the individual soul. The purpose for 
the principle of specialization—which mandates that separate parts ought not 
meddle in the affairs of others—is to assist in creating harmony within the individual 
soul and distributing order and balance in the Kallipolis. It does this by ensuring that 
each part, whether a specific class or a part of the soul, does its “just” due. And upon 
successfully doing so, justice is free to permeate the Kallipolis as well as the individual 
soul. The extrapolation here is that the principle of specialization is what ensures 
harmony and balance within their soul and is thereby enabling one to experience or 
exhibit justice in the social sphere. 
 As we have seen, Plato says that the guardians shall first be properly educated 
in music and poetry because “rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the 
soul, more than anything else, affecting it most strongly and bring[ing] it to grace” 
(402d–e). To further develop this idea, take for instance, Ludwig von Beethoven’s 
classical masterpiece, Moonlight Sonata. Often regarded as one of his most innovative 
composed works, the song exhibits a kind of free-flowing movement that creates a 
dreamy fantasia for the listener. While this piece has been improvised and performed 
world-wide, some listeners may say the song has a calming demeanor to it and has 
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remained an all-time favorite to classical music enthusiasts of all time. Moonlight 
Sonata would arguably be considered as an acceptable art form in the Kallipolis. The 
reason is because Moonlight Sonata’s melodious composition offers a harmonious 
experience to the person and to the individual soul. Again, what Plato fears most is 
the rallying of one’s passions to resist reason and submit to one’s desire (or our most 
animalistic impulses). Instead Moonlight Sonata, on Plato’s account, helps to soothe 
the passions, engage the intellect, and keeps the boisterous ones at bay; thereby, 
bringing the individual into grace – which for Plato is a moral good. The suggestion 
here is that Plato permits art as a means for some moral cause or purpose, or to 
impress upon the youth particularly some moral good. However, the question here is 
whether those arts which stir up one’s passions and overrule reason tempt the 
guardian into meddling in affairs other than their stately duties condone. In other 
words, the arts on trial are those Plato believes causes one to emulate or participate 
in their base desires—that summon an overwhelming temptation ensued from being 
exposed to imitative arts; the effects on the individual parts of the soul or the 
distortion placed upon one’s primary function within a respective class. Let us refer 
to these arts as amoral arts (arts that can reasonably be excluded from either a moral 
dimension or immoral dimension) and immoral arts (arts belonging to an immoral 
dimension). The idea here is that if art is created and disseminated with the intent to 
impress a good character or good nature—and can do so successfully—Plato takes no 
issue with it. However, if the art counteracts the primary of goal of cultivating a good 
character, establishing a harmonious balance within the soul, and distributing justice 
within the whole, Plato concludes that all art ought to be heavily censored or banned.  
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§. The Platonist and the Aesthete: Rethinking the Nature of Art and the Role of 
Morality 
In the previous section, I outlined Plato’s understanding of art as a kind of 
imitation or representation. Additionally, we unpacked the idea that mimetic art 
forms can either be copy making or impersonation. Plato argues that art as copy 
making is a potential danger, but only in an epistemic context, as it stands to inhibit 
one’s ability to look to the Forms, thereby denying access to acquire true knowledge. 
On the other hand, impersonation stands to corrupt the soul (or one’s moral 
psychology) because it entices the audience to emulate morally contentious acts. In 
addition, and perhaps more importantly, I have suggested that impersonation is in 
contention with the principle of specialization, thereby potentially disrupting the 
balance of justice within the individual and the collective. While Plato seems to be in 
favor of the mimetic arts being harnessed to arrive at a particular moral agenda,28 he 
is leery of what happens when art stirs up the passions, swaying an individual or 
community to act based on desire rather than reason.  
Looming behind Plato’s argument against art as impersonation, there seems 
to be an underlying presupposition that aesthetics and morality are one in the same. 
As previously mentioned, Plato allows for the art that furthers a moral agenda, 
however, argues that art antithetically understood in this way ought to be subjected 
to a kind of moral scrutiny. One is made to assume that a precondition within the 
value of art is that it must also have some sort of underlying, moral intent. Is it a 
                                                 
28 This could be one reason why Plato, as author, found it to be an acceptable enterprise of being a 
poet in his own time: It is possible that he believed the Republic and the entire corpus of dialogues to 
be producing 'moral' art or an art that impresses on the audience some moral good. 
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necessary condition that it exhibit moral “intent” as a precondition of its value? 
Eleonora Rocconi (2012) examines Plato’s aesthetic concerns with music to see if, and 
to what extent, he believed it was possible to appreciate the qualities of musical 
composition independently of its educational or moral value. In the Laws, Plato states 
that it is matter of prime importance for any legislator to be concerned about the 
education of its citizens’ paideia and khoreia. Paideia is defined by Plato as that 
“training from childhood in goodness, which makes a man eagerly desirous of 
becoming the perfect citizen, understanding how to rule and be ruled righteously.”29 
Khoreia, on the other hand, is “the most effective mean for educating and bringing 
order to society; it is choral dancing and singing in honor of the gods.”30 Per this view, 
what is  
sung or represented through music and dance should then represent a ‘good’ 
(kalon) model, since good postures’ (kala schemata) and good melodies’ (kala 
mete) act as a vehicle to lead people to virtues such as courage (andreia) and 
temperance (sophrosune). [Plato goes on to say that it is] for this reason, 
musical practices in the city should be closely controlled and regulated, and 
the people in charge of the task should receive suitable training for being able 
to judge them correctly. [The purpose and most crucial aspect of paideia is 
that] it “predisposes the individual through proper practices and habits to a 
correct management of pleasure (hedone) and pain (lupe)…[and] these 
                                                 
29 Eleonora Rocconi, “The Aesthetic Value of Music in Platonic Thought” In Aesthetic Value in Classical 
Antiquity, ed. Sluiter, Ineke and Ralph M. Rosen, (Boston: Brill, 2012), 113-132. 
30 Rocconi, “The Aesthetic Value of Music in Platonic Thought,” 115 
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sensations act as vehicles for the ‘goodness’ (arête) and badness (kakia) of the 
soul.31  
The aesthete, on the other hand, may have a different view on the matter. Let us first 
examine the position of a famously historic, internationally renowned advocate for 
the arts. 
In his highly regarded work, The Picture of Dorian Gray, Oscar Wilde 
beautifully describes the narrative, with a philosophical bent, of his main protagonist, 
Dorian Gray. Dorian is depicted as a handsome narcissist who willingly participates 
in self-indulgent, hedonistic activities, hedging the lines between sensualism and 
debauchery, and ultimately selling his soul to the devil to preserve his vanity and 
beauty within a portrait. The novel was first published in an 1890 issue of Lippincott’s 
Monthly Magazine32 where the editor of the magazine imposed a strict censorship of 
some of the language and content without Wilde’s knowledge.33 The book offended 
the moral sensibilities of British book reviewers, and was accused of violating the 
laws guarding the public morality.34 When the published book was made available in 
1891, Wilde included a preface in defense of the artist’s rights and art for the sake of 
art.35 The preface, made famous given its unique, aphoristic approach, served as a 
                                                 
31 Rocconi, “The Aesthetic Value of Music in Platonic Thought” 116 and see Plato, Laws, trans. G.M.A. 
Grube, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997), 1318-1616 
32Oscar Wilde (1968-9) The Artist as Critic, The Critical Writings of Oscar Wilde. (ed. Richard 
Ellmann), New York: Random House, 1-474. 
33 See Ellmann (1968-9) “Introduction” in Oscar Wilde’s The Artist as Critic, The Critical Writings of 
Oscar Wilde.  
34 See Ellmann (1968-9) “Introduction” in Oscar Wilde’s The Artist as Critic, The Critical Writings of 
Oscar Wilde. 
35 See Ellmann (1968-9) “Introduction” in Oscar Wilde’s The Artist as Critic, The Critical Writings of 
Oscar Wilde. 
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literary and artistic manifesto for artists, critics, historians, and advocates to come.36 
How can it be that something is both the object of affection and the object for one’s 
moral demise? Wilde says in the preface of The Picture of Dorian Gray, "there is no 
such thing as a moral book and an immoral book. Books are either well-written or 
badly written, that is all.37 The idea here is that like the three parts of the soul, there 
exist separate ‘parts’ within art: an aesthetic dimension and a moral dimension, to 
name a few of many possible divisions. Based on Wilde’s response, it can be inferred 
that neither dimension is concerned with the activities regarding the other. And the 
implication here is that the artist should only be concerned with the excellence of 
making, and morality has no place in a discussion on making art.38  
                                                 
36 Wilde, Oscar (1854-1900). The Picture of Dorian Gray. London; New York: Penguin, 2003. 1-214. 
37 See “Preface” to Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (2003). 
38 What’s inspiring this move to distinguish the intellectual dimension of art and the moral dimension 
of art is motivated by an understanding of a personalist approach to aesthetics. Unsatisfied with the 
scholastics and their disregard for producing a treatise on the philosophy of Fine Arts, Jacques Maritain 
writes Art and Scholasticism to explicate the nature of art and the constituents relevant to practice of 
art. He begins with an account of virtues. There are virtues of the mind whose sole end is for the sake 
of knowledge and others for the sake of something else. Those for the sake knowledge belong to a 
speculative order and the others belong to a practical order. In the speculative order, we derive from 
experience the understanding of first principles (e.g. Being, Causation, End, etc.). We perceive at once 
“the self-evident truths upon which all knowledge depends” (Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism 
with Other Essays, p. 3). Science, for instance, produces knowledge demonstrably by attributing causes. 
Wisdom (Maritain is referring the wisdom acquired in the study and practice of metaphysics and 
theology. Ibid. p. 3) makes us contemplate first causes. The practical order, on the other hand, tends to 
something other than pure knowledge. If man has knowledge in the practical order, it is because he 
intends to put what he knows to use with the view of making or doing something; such as the cobbler 
who uses his knowledge towards a desirable end – namely, to make and to mend shoes. Since its 
orientation is towards doing and not purely inward knowledge, art belongs to the practical order. The 
practical order is divided into two distinct camps: The Sphere of Action and the Sphere of Making. 
Action consists in the free use of our faculties or in the exercise of our free will. It is not necessarily 
bound to ‘things’ themselves or the works of our hands. Rather, it is simply in relation to the use to 
which we put our freedom. Hence, Action is directed towards the common end of all human life. It has 
a part to play in perfecting the human being (Ibid. p. 3) Phronēsis or Prudence (The Greek word for 
‘prudence’ to which Maritain is referencing is phronēsis. Phronēsis is often translated to mean “practical 
wisdom” or “intelligence.” In the ethical treatise On Virtues and Vices (sometimes attributed to 
Aristotle), phronēsis is characterized as the "wisdom to take counsel, to judge the goods and evils and 
all the things in life that are desirable and to be avoided, to use all the available goods finely, to behave 
rightly in society, to observe due occasions, to employ both speech and action with sagacity, to have 
expert knowledge of all things that are useful" (See Athenian Constitution, Eudemian Ethics, Virtues and 
Vices. Translated by H. Rackham), for instance, is element rightly situated in the Sphere of Action. 
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To respond to both Plato and Wilde, let us assume that when thinking about 
the moral considerations of art, there exist three different dimensions: the artist, the 
artwork, and the audience. Let us say that the primary function of the artist is to strive 
for excellence39 in the making of art. The artwork or art form is simply matter and 
form, imbued with sensible content that stimulates one’s senses. And finally, the 
audience or individual viewer is a receiver of the artistic content. In thinking about 
                                                 
Although it is confined within the limits of human conduct, it serves as guide for our actions. The 
activity of prudence involves discerning and applying the available means38 to obtain our moral ends. 
It operates for the good of the agent and presupposes that the will is undeviating in respect to the good 
(which is the good of every man). Its purpose is to determine those means as it relates to the actualized 
ends already willed by the agent. Moreover, it presupposes that the appetites involved are disposable 
to achieve those ends. The prudent rhetorician, for example, takes several things into consideration 
before he delivers a speech. He ensures that the arguments in his speech are cogent and sound. He 
properly identifies his audience and exhibits the appropriate passions. He establishes himself as a 
trustworthy character by presenting valid arguments and displaying the appropriate passions. The 
demagogue (who does not exercise prudence when delivering a speech) uses his ability to persuade to 
entice, flatter, and win others over. Making, however, is not considered in relation to the use to which 
we use put our freedom. It is simply in relation to the ‘thing’ produced. It guides what ought to be and 
is ordered to a definite end.  Art is an element of the Sphere of Making. It remains outside of human 
conduct, and its rules govern the work to be produced. The activity of art involves impressing an idea 
on matter. Maritain once again uses the paradigm of matter and form within the context of the fine arts 
to further elaborate on this intricacy of his thesis. The formal element (or formal cause38) of a work is 
controlled and directed by the mind. The work to be done is the ‘matter’ of art. The reason exercised to 
guide and the direct the matter is the ‘form’ of art. Art resides in the mind and is a subject or quality 
within the mind. It is then impressed onto matter by the exercising of the artist’s operative habit.38 In 
the case of music, the ‘matter’ in this context is final serenade which resides in the artist’s mind. The 
‘form’ is the reason exercised to compose and actualize the art in its formal element. Prudence is an 
element of the sphere of action and aims at the ends of the human good. Prudence is directed at the 
ends of human good, and its business is to determine the right means of achieving the ends. The 
challenge for Prudence (or the prudent man) then is this: to assess the situation and circumstance on 
a case by case basis, to discover the paths or rules which are subordinate to the will and contingent, 
and to execute a choice or opportunity as deemed appropriate by Prudence. If a person chooses a 
direction that’s been guided by prudence, Maritain espouses the view that the direction is certain and 
infallible. The reason being that the truth of prudential judgment is found in the undeviating intention, 
and not in the consequence of a given act. Art is an element of the sphere of making and aims at the 
ends of the work to be done. Art is more exclusively intellectual than prudence in so far as it operates 
for the good of the work to be done and diverts everything else which seeks to diminish and adulterate 
it. If an artist willfully chooses to misuse his art, or the artist defects his art through negligence, 
improper material, or lack of skill, the virtue of the art itself is no less perfect. Maritain asserts that the 
infallibility of art only concerns art in its formal element (art as a subject of the mind). Art tends to 
make the artist good only in terms of the work he produces, hence art understood in this way is an 
intellectual activity and belongs to the intellectual dimension.  
39 By ‘excellence,’ I mean the Greek concept of aretē (virtue) in the accusative of respect, i.e., “per 
virtue.” 
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morality as it relates to art, one question that arises is this: which actor in this 
tripartite relationship holds the burden of accountability? In other words, must the 
artist be held accountable for the artworks’ moral content? Or, is the viewer 
(audience) accountable? Or, is it a shared responsibility between the two? Is a large, 
governing, political body accountable? Or does the burden exist at the individual 
level? Given Plato’s reaction to the artist who promulgated his unsolicited art forms 
for the Kallipolis, Plato might say that the burden for moral delegation is first 
overseen by the larger, established political structure, and then by the artist. This 
paper, which differs from Plato’s reaction, takes the position that the culpable player 
held liable for their moral development belongs to the audience, and at times, the 
parental figures of the home. Let me explain. 
In thinking about the Platonic notion of art, what makes art “dangerous” is its 
ability to stir the passions, thus allowing or inviting one to justify taking sides with 
their base desires. However, one qualifier I think must be highlighted is that art 
(absent from its moral considerations) is a kind of techne, or craft. Thus, art is a kind 
of knowledge. I propose that for a craft to be instrumental to one’s moral cultivation, 
art must engage the intellect in the end. This is an important distinction for the 
aesthete because if art is first situated as a means or a kind of catalyst for intellectual 
engagement, it quickly distinguishes itself from other “art forms” that are 
misconstrued by blurring the lines between art and smut, or art and propaganda, and 
so forth. By placing art in the intellectual sphere, the aesthete can enjoy all the fruits 
of making and what it is aesthetically pleasing about art, while avoiding any need for 
moral adherence in the artist’s practice. 
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To further develop this idea, take for instance a controversial, contemporary 
example of imitative arts. The 1997 single Smack My Bitch Up, written and recorded 
by the British beat group The Prodigy, quickly became critically acclaimed as one of 
the most controversial songs of the 90s. The lyrics in the song, “Change my pitch up, 
smack my bitch up,” are repeated throughout the entirety of the song. The music video 
is filmed from a first-person perspective. We witness a person drinking and driving, 
abusing cocaine, acting out in violence, vomiting, committing vandalism, and 
engaging in an explicit sex scene toward the end of the video. The viewer most likely 
concludes that the main character is some young, misogynistic male, intensely 
focused on participating in activities that are reckless, dangerous, illegal, and highly 
immoral. It is not until the very last scene of the video that we learn the main 
character is a young, blonde female. And in that same moment, all of our preconceived 
judgments about the character, their activities, and their treatment of others are 
called into question. Herein lies a pivotal crossroads for the aesthete and for Plato, 
and for those who passionately disagree with the strategies for harnessing and 
controlling art as suggested in the Republic, during Plato’s time, Wilde’s time, and our 
contemporary time. How does one find cohesiveness amidst the fogginess of 
disagreement? One suggestion might be to understand exactly at what point do both 
sides disagree and to highlight possible places where both the Platonist and the 
Aesthete can come together.  
As indicated in the preface of the Picture of Dorian Gray, Wilde’s primary 
concern regarding the arts is the excellence of craft. Plato would have understood 
excellence or virtue as aretē and craft as a kind of techne. For Wilde, the notion of 
Liddell 30 
 
whether an artwork imbues an immoral character is meaningless if the piece is made 
well and exhibits all the features of strong craft. Given the inferior nature of art, to 
Plato’s mind, whether a piece exhibits excellence is a non-issue, because Plato is 
concerned with any image or physical object that ignites the passions to engage an 
unstable, lower part of the soul. To address this issue, it is helpful to take a step back 
and look at the nature of arts—in this case, mimetic art specifically—and to examine 
its genus and differentia. In the genus of mimetic arts, there exists members of three 
classes: those arts which can ignite the passions and engage the reason, arts that 
excite and engage our base desires, and lastly, the remaining members of the mimetic 
arts that are neither moral or amoral in kind. For the sake of simplicity, I shall refer 
to each member of this genus as moral art forms, immoral art forms, and amoral art 
forms. In the case of each art form, there exists standards or properties or qualities 
that render them as such. While quality can exist in many different variations, an art 
form is either made well or it is not made well. The standard of quality is applicable 
in all art forms, whether moral, immoral, or amoral. So perhaps it is not the case that 
all art forms ought to be eliminated. Should an art form exhibit the quality of being 
made well—which satisfies Wilde’s criteria, and that art form also engages one’s 
reasons, per Plato’s specifications, it seems as if there can exist a working definition 
and ideology by which the Platonist and the aesthete can have a conversation about 
the value of art in which they are not talking past each other; namely, an art form that 
engages the intellect and exhibits a craft made well. 
It is helpful to know that many have challenged Plato: even if the poets have 
no knowledge of truth, and can only reflect to their audience the uninformed opinions 
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that circulate society (602a–b), is it not the case that poetry can raise critical 
questions about these opinions? A Platonist might respond and affirm that while 
poetry can raise questions, the problems lie in the fact that poetry provides no 
resources other than opinion all over again.40 Despite poetry’s inability to coach the 
individual on the discerning powers of discursive reasoning, the idea is that poetry, 
and other mimetic arts which engage the intellect, do inspire one to raise critical 
questions. And it is through this inspiration that one may be prompted to seek truth. 
From here, we take the idea of arts that engage the intellect, and apply it to Plato’s 
Divided Line theory, and the Allegory of the Cave. 
 
§. Sun, Line, and the Cave 
 For Plato, the acquisition of knowledge requires one to turn away from the 
world of senses and physical objects—which can only ever produce opinions—and 
look to the realm of the Forms, which are perfect and intelligible. To understand this 
idea, Plato uses two metaphors: The Divided Line and the Allegory of the Cave, to 
further understand his application of the Theory of Forms. Our goal in this section is 
to investigate the role of mimetic arts as they relate to the sensible world and the 
individual soul and to examine whether art produces a benefit that engages one’s 
intellect to shifts one’s efforts toward the acquisition of knowledge.  
 At the end of Book V in the Republic, the argument and analogies for the sun, 
line, and cave begin to take form. The point of the sun is to provide correspondence 
                                                 
40 Rachana Kamtekar, “Plato on Education and Art” 
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between the visible and intelligible realms.41 In the visible realm, the sun gives light 
to physical objects required by the eyes to access the physical world.42 Corresponding 
to the sun in the intelligible realm is the Good.43 Plato says, “What gives truth to the 
things known and the power to know to the knower is the Form of the Good. And 
though it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge” (508e). 
To elucidate this thought, in Platonic metaphysics, the sun is the entity responsible 
for the knowability of objects, both in the visible realm and intelligible realm.  
 The line starts from the broad division stipulated by sun and creates a dualism: 
there is the intelligible realm and the visible realm.44 Each realm is divided into two, 
unequal parts (509D–510A). The former is said to encompass epistêmê, often 
translated as knowledge, and the latter, doxa: opinion or mere objects incapable of 
becoming objects of genuine questions.45 In the visible realm, one finds visible things 
such as shadows, or images, or eikasia, and physical objects, or pistis—faith and belief 
set over the physical world.46 In the intelligible realm, one finds higher entities such 
as mathematical objects or objects of science, or dianoia—a kind of discursive 
reasoning, and Ideas or Forms, noesis, or pure intuition.47 Ideas or Forms, and the 
Good are the highest object of direct knowledge. Physical objects are imperfect copies 
that share in the Forms, while images are images of physical objects, thus twice 
removed.  
                                                 
41 Silverman, Allan, "Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition) 
42 Ibid. Silverman, Allan, "Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology" 
43 Ibid. Silverman, Allan, "Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology" 
44 Ibid. Silverman, Allan, "Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology" 
45 Ibid. Silverman, Allan, "Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology" 
46 Ibid. Silverman, Allan, "Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology" 
47 Ibid. Silverman, Allan, "Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology" 
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 The cave, which is arguably one of Plato’s most famous allegories, reinforces 
the message of the line. In this analogy, the prisoners are seated and chained so that 
they cannot move their heads. They stare at a cave wall on which they see projected 
images. These images are cast from carved figures illuminated by a fire carried by 
people, hidden by a wall behind the prisoners. A prisoner is loosed from his chains, 
and first notices the carved images and the fire. Then he is let out of the cave into the 
outside world, or the “real” world. Upon exiting the cave, the prisoner is blinded by 
the sun. Thus, he is unable to look at the physical objects outside, and instead focuses 
on their shadows and reflections in the water. As he adapts to the light and is now 
finally able to gaze upon those objects, he notices their physical form, and then looks 
up—attributing the visibility of objects to the sun.  
 In the case of mimetic arts, whether copy making or impersonation, those arts 
are found in the visible realm on Plato’s divided line. Since an image is like a shadow 
or a phantom, Plato would say that we need eikasia, to make sense of the images in 
the visible realm. As previously mentioned, mimetic arts, particularly copy making, 
pose a threat by promoting willful ignorance and deterring one from seeking truth—
this of course could include morality which Plato suggests is a kind of knowledge (see 
Meno, 87b–c).). On the other hand, mimetic arts that are impersonating in nature, and 
hence entice the individual to emulate morally impermissible behaviors, threaten to 
corrupt the moral psychology of the soul. To further elaborate, it is helpful to tie this 
into a modern example. 
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Throughout history, succeeding Plato’s influence, there have been examples of 
totalitarian states or states ruled by the indoctrination48 of collective leadership who 
have implemented some of the ideologies offered in the Republic, specifically as they 
relate to censorship and the noble falsehood regarding origins of matters of state. 
George Orwell dedicates his renowned novella Animal Farm to the events leading up 
to the Stalinist era of the Soviet Union. Orwell profusely criticized Joseph Stalin. He 
believed that the Soviet Union had become a brutal dictatorship built upon a cult of 
personality and enforced by fear and terror. His reason for writing Animal Farm was 
to manifest a fully acquainted attempt at fusing together political and artistic purpose 
into a critical whole. Animal Farm is satirical in nature. It humorously describes the 
character and activities of the individual animals to deliver the novella’s most 
controversial messages. What makes the book an attractive reflection of the emotions 
                                                 
48 It is helpful to know that Plato supports the idea that indoctrination for the common good is morally 
permissible and justifiable, especially when it comes to children. Plato introduces the Noble Lie in the 
fictional tale known as the myth metals. The idea is to provide a falsehood on the origins of the 
stratified class system, and as way to make the members of the society care about the social and 
political structure of the state. He says, “...the earth, as being their mother, delivered them, and now, as 
if their land were their mother and their nurse, they ought to take thought for her and defend her 
against any attack, and regard the other citizens as their brothers and children of the self-same 
earth...While all of you, in the city, are brothers, we will say in our tale, yet god, in fashioning those of 
you who are fitted to hold rule, mingled gold in their generation, for which reason they are the most 
precious — but in the helpers, silver, and iron and brass in the farmers and other craftsmen. And, as 
you are all akin, though for the most part you will breed after your kinds, it may sometimes happen 
that a golden father would beget a silver son, and that a golden offspring would come from a silver sire, 
and that the rest would, in like manner, be born of one another. So that the first and chief injunction 
that the god lays upon the rulers is that of nothing else are they to be such careful guardians, and so 
intently observant as of the intermixture of these metals in the souls of their offspring, and if sons are 
born to them with an infusion of brass or iron they shall by no means give way to pity in their treatment 
of them, but shall assign to each the status due to his nature and thrust them out among the artisans 
or the farmers. And again, if from these there is born a son with unexpected gold or silver in his 
composition they shall honor such and bid them go up higher, some to the office of guardian, some to 
the assistanceship, alleging that there is an oracle that the city shall then be overthrown when the man 
of iron or brass is its guardian” (416c-417e). While Plato himself is proposing a kind of aristocratic 
state and the presence of a philosopher king, firmly grounded in moral virtuous values, he too suggests 
that an aristocracy has the capacity to denigrate into other kinds of political states: timocracy, 
oligarchy, democracy, and finally, tyranny (See Plato, Republic VII, for a detailed account of Plato’s five 
political regimes). 
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of its audience is its chronological narration of the rise of power. The audience is made 
aware that not all the animals are equal in terms of the ability, intellect, or status on 
the farm. The pigs, who are described as the most cunning and intelligent of all the 
animals, use their intellect to manipulate the other animals on the farm by lying, 
stealing, and later, instilling fear. At the end of the story, what once started off as 
Animal Farm, where all animals were equal, was restored back to The Manor Farm. 
And with its restoration, the assertion of the final commandment—that all animals 
are equal, but some animals are more equal than others—was made. This novella is 
not only paramount in its importance as it relates to the history it signifies, but it also 
creates a teachable moment for the reader.  
 The book engages the intellect through satire and humor—examples of 
literary devices used to appeal to the sentiment of the reader—to show what happens 
when one is not made aware, or one does not question. In other words, it shows the 
potential consequences of lack of awareness and critical engagement for both the 
individual and the whole. What happens when an individual chooses to engage the 
work and pose meaningful questions? Like the prisoner loosened from his chains and 
observing the fire and objects carried in front of it, the individual elevates his state of 
understanding and pursues truth. Now a Platonist may object and say that all Orwell’s 
work has raised questions but is ill-equipped to allow one to reason discerningly 
about the moral and political contentions of the novella, maintaining that mimetic 
arts continue to reassert opinion. I maintain the idea that while art, in and of itself, 
does not house the kind of evaluative or discursive powers to allow one to examine 
their own ethical system, art can pose reflective questions for one to pit against their 
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individual value system. In this reclassification of mimetic arts, the individual is less 
tempted to embrace eikasia, and instead arts that engage the intellect, encourage their 
viewers—or readers—to question. Furthermore, I concede and say what is needed in 
this sequence is to equip each member in an audience with the ability to reason about 
their own moral compass, which necessitates the cultivation and development of 
critical thinking skills. As Plato suggests, this is where the role of dialectic, or dianoia, 
comes into play. 
 A Platonist might concede that works of art that engage the intellect might 
inspire one to pose reflective questions once they have reached the age of reason, but 
what about in the case of children? Surely most children are not only incapable of 
reflecting critically, but depending on their age and development, may not have the 
language or capacity to pose questions at all. In the following section, I address Plato’s 
concern about the mimetic arts as they relate to children, to explore to what extent 
children have the capability to ward off the moral dangers of art and whose 
responsibility is to help them do so. 
 
§. Mimetic Arts & the Case of Children 
At this point, we explored Plato’s conviction that the aesthetic dimension 
overlaps with the moral dimension. It is because of this view that Plato thinks all art 
ought to undergo moral scrutiny. The aesthete, on the other hand, suggests that 
aesthetics and morality are two completely different enterprises, hence one should 
not be concerned with the other. My suggestion is that aesthetics and morality be 
separated and evaluated independently of one another to some extent. I believe this 
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is best done by reclassifying art as an activity associated with the intellectual realm, 
the express purpose of which is to engage the intellect. 
In making this move and distinguishing our understanding of art’s purpose 
from Plato’s, it becomes even more clear why Plato takes issue with art that is not 
aligned with morality. Art, which stirs the passions, is dangerous for a society which 
seeks to maintain and sustain itself as a collective. The aesthete counters this idea by 
suggesting that art, which may depict morally contentious content, yet successfully 
engages the intellect to encourage one to analyze their own moral compass, shows 
the world its own shame by utilizing visual or written content. And such efforts, 
though polemical, are necessary in creating teachable moments for the individual 
viewer. Even if Plato were hard-pressed to concede to this idea, his concern, and 
arguably the strength of his argument against imitative arts, lies in his concern about 
the corruptibility of children. In several places in the Republic, Plato speaks out 
against the arts due to their ability to corrupt children’s impressionable souls. He 
believes that it is the children who are the most susceptible to the crippling 
temptation of the arts, and suggests in Laws II that this is partly due to their inability 
to grasp the rational account at such an early age. He says, 
I maintain that the earliest sensations that a child feels in infancy are of 
pleasure and pain, and this is the route by which virtue and vice first enter the 
soul. (But for a man to acquire good judgment and unshakable correct 
opinions, however late in life, is a matter of good luck; a man who possesses 
them, and all the benefits they entail is perfect.) I call ‘education’ the initial 
acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, 
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pain and hatred, that well up in his soul and are channeled in the right courses 
before he can understand the reason why. Then when he does understand, his 
reason and his emotions agree in telling him that he has been properly trained 
by inculcation of appropriate habits. Virtue is this general concord of reason 
and emotion. But there is one element you could isolate in any account you 
give, and this is the correct formation of our feelings of pleasure and pain, 
which makes us hate what we ought to hate from first to last, and love what 
we ought to love. Call his education, and I at any rate think you would be giving 
it its proper name (653a–c). 
In this passage, Plato provides an early account of psychology and child development. 
He suggests that for most children the earliest lessons they receive are channeled 
through their emotional responses. And for them to start deciphering between 
pleasure (or pleasurable emotions such as happiness, joy) and pain (or painful 
emotions such as fear, anxiety), they must first be taught by continually participating 
in practices that expose them to virtue and vice. As previously mentioned, one reason 
Plato may take issue with arts is that they are distributed for public consumption 
without moral scrutiny and because the arts themselves do not provide the tools or 
an invitation to engage them through the lens of reason or one’s moral system. 
 One may suggest that Plato would have benefitted from this: tools for critical 
thinking about the arts need to be incorporated into the pedagogy of the education 
curriculum, rather than the arts banished from the students’ purview. While it is the 
case that the arts may or may not empower the viewer with the means to critically 
reason about the content’s ethical implications, I maintain that any art that engages 
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the intellect can pose meaningful questions for reflection and consideration. One may 
ask then, “Why doesn’t Plato introduce Philosophy earlier in the curriculum?” In the 
Republic, the guardian undergoes years of training, covering various topics, however, 
philosophy is something that is introduced later in life. One may ask, “Why doesn’t 
Plato allow the children to learn philosophy?” He says on the topic of introducing 
philosophy too early, 
For I fancy you have not failed to observe that lads, when they first get a taste 
of disputation, misuse it as a form of sport, always employing it contentiously, 
and, imitating confuters, they themselves confute others. They delight like 
spies in pulling about and tearing with words all who approach them…And 
when they have themselves been confuted by many they quickly fall into a 
violent distrust of all that they formerly held true; and the outcome is that they 
themselves and the whole business of philosophy are discredited with other 
men…But an older man will not share this craze…but rather choose to imitate 
the one who consents to examine truth dialectically than the one who makes a 
jest and a sport of mere contradiction, and so he will himself be more 
reasonable and moderate, and bring credit rather than discredit upon his 
pursuit (539c–d).  
Plato’s comments can be interpreted in several different ways. One way, which 
seems glaringly apparent, is that in addition to questioning whether a child can grasp 
the rational account, another concern is whether a child can understand and apply 
logic and dialectic, and even if so, whether they possess the maturity and wit to 
properly apply their newfound powers of discernment. Plato seems to think the 
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answer is no, that children—and by children he means all those below the age of 
thirty-five (see Kamtekar 2006)—are not mature enough in cognitive or emotional 
development to fully grasp and harness the practice that is philosophy.  
 While it is challenging to say whether this account is true, one may agree that 
Plato’s argument still seems feasible. One may respond to Plato and suggest that 
perhaps, the level of critical engagement is altered or fashioned in a way that appeals 
to an appropriate audience or age group? Or maybe what we understand as 
contemporary critical engagement and what Plato means by philosophy is that it 
needs further consideration to determine what is meant and intended by both? In the 
case of children, a proposal one may offer is that perhaps a secondary element or 
figure is needed to assist in a child’s cultivation of character, and that is of the wise 
parent, guardian or mentor who serves as a reinforcement to check in and engage the 
child’s critical engagement. Again, what makes art so dangerous, is unlike some 
physical objects in the visible realm, mimetic art forms can rouse the emotions to 
either join forces with reason or with desire. While it seems feasible to suggest that a 
child cannot reason discernably utilizing advanced tools such as dialectic to tackle 
complex ethical queries, the child can experience sensations – like most persons –
which help to lead to conclusions about right from wrong, good from bad (as Plato 
too acknowledges). Take for instance, the guardian who is preparing a meal in the 
kitchen, and the young child – not fully capable to grasp the rational account – comes 
running into the kitchen with eager eyes and curiosity about the activities taking 
place. Through the periphery of their eyes, the child spots a flame emitting from atop 
of the stove. Curious to understand this phenomenon vexing their senses, they 
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approach the stove. The guardian warns the child by appealing to their intellect and 
says, “do not touch the stove! The stove is hot.” Not having the experience of burning 
hot sensation, the child examines the stove and touches it against the warnings of 
their caretaker. The child cries out in agony as she experiences the pain of “hot” for 
the first time. In this example, by a reinforcement of sensation in their environment, 
the child has learned “hot stove” equals “pain,” and “pain” equals “hurt” or 
“displeasure.” The caretaker tends to the child’s wounds and reinforces the lesson, 
“See? The stove is hot. Ouchy.” In most cases, a child who experiences this pain often 
chooses not to experience it again – though of course there are exceptional cases. The 
idea inferred from this example is the child has learned – through strong sensation – 
and developed a kind of reasoning about displeasurable experiences or objects in the 
physical environment – which Plato will not object to (653a). Its seems feasible that 
this same idea of reinforcing positive and negative consequences through sensation and 
emotions (pleasure or pain) to develop one’s reason can be applied to mimetic arts – 
arts that utilize emotion to engage the intellect and pose meaningful questions about 
what one is experiencing. Regardless, the idea here is that critical engagement is a 
necessary addition to education to ensure the development of one’s moral 
psychology. Perhaps in the case of the child, it is only the strong, educated, worldly 
mentor, parent who can provide guidance to youth who might be led astray, and art 
plays an important but supportive role in allowing for that development.  
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§. Conclusion 
 This paper sought out to accomplish a few crucial tasks. The first was to 
explore a cohesive philosophy that recognizes art as a source of moral danger, and an 
alternative philosophy that recognizes art as something worth preserving. It did this 
by first delineating mimetic art as copy making from mimetic art as impersonation. It 
set the stage by officiating that art as copy making and art as impersonation pose a 
cognitive and moral threat, whether that is by promoting ignorance or by corrupting 
the soul. Art as copy making poses an epistemic worry and not necessarily a danger 
to its viewer’s moral psychology. The paper than shifted its focus to a close 
examination of imitative arts that are representational. Plato uses examples of poetry 
and theatre, but this paper broadened the scope of what he meant by art qua imitation 
to contemporary examples of representational art. 
In closely examining his position as it relates to imitative arts, we find Plato’s 
deeper concern is not solely that art interferes with the cultivation of a good soul, but 
that imitative art stands to interfere with the principle of specialization, the governing 
rule for the harmonious balance within the individual soul and the permeation of 
justice within the collective society. My suggestion was that by separating the moral 
dimension from the aesthetic dimension—which is a move in line with Plato’s call for 
specialization—and classifying each dimension as performing its own separate 
enterprise, mimetic art forms can be viewed as something less suspect and more 
capable of contribution—specifically, turning one from the phantom images of eikasia 
to something higher requiring initial questioning and critical reflection. From there, 
aesthetics has been resituated as a kind of techne or knowledge, and its purpose is to 
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stir the passions to engage the intellect. By making this move, the artist is free to 
pursue the excellence (arête) of making art. 
We acknowledge that the arts do not have as a part of their domain the 
evaluative powers to equip the viewer with the tools one needs to reason, reflect, and 
critically engage—that when appropriately honed are capable of augmenting one’s 
ability to ward off moral dangers. While Plato is concerned that children are too 
young to fully grasp or appreciate an early introduction to philosophy, this does not 
necessitate that some age-appropriate version of a critical thinking, perhaps one that 
is integrated alongside the teaching of other subjects, is out of the question. 
In this paper, I have shown that art understood as a purely intellectual activity 
can save itself from moral scrutiny by resting on the foundation that an art form made 
well and engages the intellect in turns stands to move one up the divided line, closer 
to the intelligible realm, as compared to an art form that only appeals to one’s base 
desires. And by delineating its function while simultaneously introducing critical 
thinking as a defense against the moral dangers of art, art can enjoy the aesthetic 
freedom of making while simultaneously critically engaging the intellect. 
Additionally, art that stirs the emotions provides opportunities for the viewer to 
return from a place of shock or awe to a place of renewed belief or conviction and 
winds up being a meaningful tool for the cultivation of reason, thus securing itself a 
utilitarian place in Plato’s call for justice and the health of the soul.  
Finally, it must be noted that Plato’s introduction of the Republic was a first 
attempt at social reform within the Greek city-state system during his time. Plato’s 
influence has had a global effect and has impacted many societies since his time and 
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far away from Greece in place. This paper is not attempting to situate itself as a 
catalyst to promulgate social reform nor to present a specific path to social reform. It 
does however, set the stage for others to reflect and ask pressing questions that 
surround the debate on the arts and censorship, the proper educational model for 
children and society-at-large, and the role of Plato’s ancient, constructive model of 
what a conducive, healthy, and flourishing society looks like, and how we can (or 
should) implement modern versions of those own ideals in our contemporary 
contexts. 
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